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This article reviews Australian wages policy in .the period 1983 to 1990. The period 
can be divided into 3 phases, each char,acterized by differing environmental and/or 
political circumstances impinging upon wages policy. The first phase, {he period of 
the wages pa,use /freeze, ended with the National Wage Case of September 1983 
when the Industrial Relations ·Commiss.ion reintroduced wage .indexation. F ,ull 
indexation was the hallmark of the second period, from September 1983 to March 
1987. The deteriorating balance of payments situation led to the abandonment of 
indexation and the search for ,gr,eater labour flexibility. The per.iod since 1987 has 
been characterized by a wage regime which has attempted to impose ,a form of 
administered flexibility . 
1. The w.ages freeze and th ~e return to indexation 
An earlier article in this journal described the political and economi~c circumstances 
leading to the ~Coalition Government imposing a 12-month wages freeze on the public 
sector and seeking to have the Industrial Relations Commission (hereafter the 
Commission) impose a similar freeze on the private sector (Plowman, 1984). The 
Com.mission imposed a 6 month "wages pause", a situation which was to be reviewed in 
June 1983. 
By June 1983, the Coalition had been swept from office. Labor had used its period 
in opposition to build important links with the union movement by way of the 
Australian Labor Advisory Committee. One fruit of this committee was the Prices and 
Incomes Accord which attempted to tackle the twin problems of inflation and 
unemployment simultaneously. 'That policy differed from the "inflation first" policy of 
the ~Coalition. 'The Accord, agreed to by the union .movement following the 
announcem~ent of federal elections in February 1983, committed a future Labor 
government to the use of fiscal and monetary policy to stimulate employment. The 
union movement agreed to exefcise wage restraint to ensure that government policies 
would not be merely inflationary. The Accord noted that: 
. . . the fundamental feature of the prolonged and worsening economic crisis both 
here and overseas is that, ~or the first time in our history, we are experiencing 
simultaneously high levels of unemployment and inflation. This occurrence 
was not foreseen by economists and has ·caused great difficulty and uncertainty 
for governments in all countries in determining an appropriate economic 
policy (Australian Council of Trade Unions, 1983). 
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After surveying attempts to curb stagflation by monetary policies, policies which 
had led to double digit unemployment and double digit inflation in Australia, the Accord 
partners noted: 
It is with this experience in mind that both organisations have seen fit to try to 
develop a mutually agreed policy on prices and incomes in Australia for 
implementation by a Labor Government. Such a policy offers by far the best 
prospect of enabling Australia to experience prolonged higher rates of 
economic and employment growth, and accompanying growth in living 
standards, without incurring the circumscribing penalty of higher inflation, by 
providing for resolution of conflicting income claims at lower levels of 
inflating than would otherwise be the case. With inflation control being 
achieved in this way, budgetary and monetary policies may be responsibly set 
to promote economic and employment growth, thus enabling unemployment to 
be reduced and living standards to rise (Australian Council of Trade Unions, 
1983). 
The Accord has been an important plank underlying wages policy since March 1983 
when Labor won office. Since that time there have been 6 variants of the Accord. 
Shortly after winning the elections, Labor gave evidence of its "consensus" style of 
government by holding a National Economic Summit Conference. This conference, held 
in .Parliament House Canberra, provided a forum for governments, employers, unions and 
other sections of the community to proffer approaches to national economic recovery. 
There was a general support for a centralized wage fixing system. The Summit 
Conference communique stated, .inter alia: 
19. All the parties believe that the principles of wage fixation should be such 
as to provide wage justice to all employees whilst seeking to ensure that wage 
increases do not give added impetus to inflation or unemployment. 
20. It is believed that a centralised approach to wage fixation is the most 
equitable means by which the objectives can be met. It is recognised that if a 
centralised system is to work effectively as the only way in which wage 
increases are generated, a suppression of sectional claims is essential except in 
special or extraordinary circumstances prov~ed before the centralised wage 
fixing authority. 
21 . The Summit therefore proposes that the parties should as a matter of 
priority develop the option of a return to a centralised system under the auspices 
of the Australian Conciliation and Arbitration Commission. 
22. To progress the development of a centralised wage system a conference 
should be convened by the President of the Commission. 
23. The centralised wage fixing principles developed by the Conciliation and 
Arbitration Commission should provided the framework for the operation of 
other wage-fixing tribunals in Australia, but the Summit recognises the 
authority and autonomy of these tribunals (National Economic Summit 
Communique, 1983 ). 
In response to the communique, the Commission convened a wage fixing conference 
in late April 1983. This confer~ence met irregularly until June and identified 23 issues 
which needed addressing. In the end result, the President noted that though there was 
agreement "regarding the need for a centralised system, there were differenc.es as to the 
way in which the system should operate" (Moore, 1983). The Australian ~Council of 
Trade Unions (ACTU) sought the maintenance of real wages through wage indexation. 
The Confederation of Australian Industry (CAl) argued that real wages could only be 
maintained by increasing wages in line with productivity. 
In August, the ACTU submitted national wage claims which compelled the 
Commission, not only to determine whether or not wage determination should be 
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centralized, but also whether or not the "wages pause" should be extended. The 
government submission strongly supported a return to centralized wage dete1anination: 
... the consensus reached in the Accord and at the Summit would be undermined. 
It might not be possible for the Government to meet its commitment to bring 
about sustained economic recovery through an expansionary fiscal policy as 
the achievement of community restraint in terms of income claims depends on 
the successful implementation of the prices and income policy. Even short 
term stimulus could be ruled out. 
The task of reducing unemployment would be made more difficult and 
dependent almost entirely on ex temal factors and on the extent of recovery of 
the world economy in particular. Some may suggest that the current economic 
crisis and in particular the high rate of unemployment .and fear of job security 
·would temper demands for wage increases. While this is an arguable position, 
the government"s view is that it probably would not be so (Australian 
Conciliation and Arbitration Commission 1983, p.13). 
Not only did the Labor Government support the return of a centralized system which 
its predecessor had opposed, it further sought the return of wage indexation, a system 
largely scrapped at the request of the previous Government: 
Fundamental in the ~Government's approach to the ·centralised system is the 
high degree of real wage security it must offer to wage and salary earners. Only 
in exceptional and compelling circumstances should any departure from full 
indexation occur. In our submission, without this degree of certainty the 
system could not provide the stability in ·wage determination for the medium 
and longer term that is crucial in the government's prices and incomes policy 
(Australian Conciliation and Arbitration Commission, 1983, p.15). 
Based on the 1975 to 1981 experience, the Commission noted that a full indexation 
system, to be sustainable ~economically and industrially, had to meet a number of 
requirements. The ~commission drew attention to 8 requirements. Wage increases 
outside National Wage cases had to be minimal. Thus, the system had to contain "an 
acceptable and workable procedure for dealing with non-confounists". The "nature and 
requirements of the centralised system [had to be] understood at all levels of the trade 
unions movement". The Accord parties had a responsibility for ,ensuring this requirement 
\vas met. There was also the need to accept "that it may be necessary to grant less than 
full indexation on rare occasions". Restraint on prices and non-wag~e incomes was 
considered an important factor in sustaining wage restraint. The Commission not~ed that 
the Accord provided for the development of mechanisms such as a Prices Surveillance 
Authority and "taxation measures to ensure that non-wage inco.mes in general do not 
move out of line with :movements in wages and salaries". There was also the need for the 
Government to take account of taxation effects, both direct and indirect, on wage claims. 
There was the need for the ACfU to abandon claims for ·wage losses d.wing the period of 
the freeze or "pause". Finally, the principles had to be applied consistently and 
rigorously by all members of the Commission. 
The ~Commission founulated national wage guide-lines to these ends. In summary, 
these provided for: (a) Half yearly indexation in relation to the Eight Capital Cities 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) "unless it was persuaded to the contrary by those seeking to 
oppose the adjustment". The foun of indexation was to be "uniform percentage 
adjustment unless the Commission decides otherwise in the light of exceptional 
circumstances". (b) Upon application the Commission would consider whether there 
should be any improvements in wages or working conditions on account of national 
productivity. No applications on this ground would be considered befor~e 1985. (c) 
Unions seeking national wage increases had to give an undertaking to comply with the 
principles. (d) Limiting and strenuous provisions w~ere provided for wage increases on 
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account of changes in work value - changes in tho ....., of 
responsibility required, or the conditions under which the WCJJtE 
Procedures were established for dealing with wage anomalies and 
to be processed through peak union and employer bodies by a FuH 
Commission. 
-(e) 
These were 
of the 
The principles became operational on October 6, at which time those Uilbts prepared 
to give the required undertakings had their award wages increased by 4.3 percent. Only 2 
unions prevaricated before giving the required undertakings. 
In April1984, the Commission convened a National Wage case to considez claims 
relating to the movements in the CPI for the September and December 1983 qua• ters of 
1.6 percent and 2.4 percent respectively. The Commission heard evidence of "tentative" 
signs of economic recovery. There had been a fall in the rate of unemployment from 
10.3 percent in June 1983 to 9.4 percent in Febtuary 1984. Job vacancies had risen. 
Both farm and non-farm Gross Domestic Product grew strongly in the Septelnber quarter. 
The OECD had forecast a growth in Australia's GDP of S.2S percent for 1984. There had 
been an uptwu in manufacturing and dwelling construction. The balance of payments on 
current account had benefited from the improvement in exports and a decline in imports. 
There was evidence of a recovery in the world economy. 
Though there was broad agreement on the state of the economy, there were sharp 
differences about the proper course for wages. Employers and the Tasmanian and 
Northern Territory gove~nments opposed any wage increases. If the Commission was of 
a mind to grant wage increases, the CAl requested discounting of the CPI for government 
charges and tax induced price increases. The Queensland Government sought plateau 
indexation with the threshold being the Average Minimum Weekly Award rate. In 
support of their claim for a full 4.1 percent increase. the AC1U and the Commonwealth 
placed considerable emphasis on the Accord as the basis for economic recovery. The 
AC1U argued: 
... the policies of the Accord provide the basis for continued government 
stimulus necessary to further develop the initial economic improvement, 
provide a stable wage fixation environment and through the Medicare effect 
provide the means for a specific and significant anti-inflationary effect 
(Australian Conciliation and Arbitration Commission, 1984, p.9). 
In supporting the application for the full4.1 percent the Commonwealth submitted: 
If the centralised system were to falter at an early stage of its development then 
the consequences for both industrial relations and economy recovery would be 
serious indeed. It is essential that the centralised system retains the confidence 
of wage and salary earners by safeguarding their living standards. That will 
contribute to the effectiveness of the prices and incomes policy and will ensure 
that wage outcomes remain consistent with economy recovery (Australian 
Conciliation and Arbitration Commission, 1984, p.9). 
The prices and incomes Accord, the Government noted, was the "cornerstone of its 
economic sttategy". 
After surveying government-induced price increases the Commission rejected the 
CAl's submission for CPI discounting. In the light of post-1986 decisions, its reasoning 
is worth noting: 
The adoption of CAl's reasoning on this question could well lead to partial 
indexation on a regular basis, an approach which would be inconsistent with 
the concept underlying the present indexation package. Further, we believe 
that to interfere with the CPI by way of discounting, even if justified on 
economic logic, may reduce confidence in the preaent system and weaken 
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commitment to it (Australian Conciliation and Arbitration Commission. 1984, 
p.l2). 
The Commission granted the unions' claim for a full 4.1 percent increase. 
The wage guide-lines adopted in September 1983 should have resulted in a second 
National Wage case commencing in August 1984 to review CPI increases for the March 
and June 1984 quarters. However, both these quarters were affected by the Bureau of 
Statistics' treatment of the method of financing medical services under the Medicare 
scheme. This resulted in a reduction in the CPI for those quarters of 2.5 percent. The 
overall movement in the CPI for the frrst 2 quarters of 1984 was -0.4 percent and 0.2 
percent respectively, a net outcome of -0.2 percent. At a conference chaired by the 
Commission's Pr.esident, it was agreed that there would be no union or employer 
applications for the March and June quarters. The agreement stated: 
1 . All parties indicate that they do not propose to make an application for dte 
scheduled hearing in respect of the -0.2 percent CPI figure. 
2. The .ACTU will make an application to the next National Wage Case in 
February to consider movements in the CPI in the September and December 
quarters 1984. 
3 . All parties will have the right to argue as to the w.ay in which the -0.2 
percent should be treated in the context of that hearing. The ACTU has 
indicated that it will oppose any discounting of its application by the -0.2 
percent. 
4. All parties have the right to make such submissions about the Principles as 
they think fit. 
5 . Further discussion will take place betw·een the CAl and the ACfU regarding 
certain outstanding alleged anomalies (Moore, 1984 ). 
The National Wage cases of 1985 were accompanied by optimistic economic 
outlooks. In the case which ~concluded in April, the evidence suggested that employment 
had risen by 3.3 percent over the previous 12 months while the rate of unemployment 
had fallen from 9.4 to :8.3 percent. Wages drift (i.e. wage increases outside indexation) 
was minimal. There was a significant fall in average real unit labour costs. The profit 
share of GDP was back to historic norms. Retail sales wer·e up., as was private 
investment. International economic recovery was expected to continue throughout 1985. 
There were, however, areas of concern: the rate of unemployment was still v·ery high; 
there had been a sharp depreciation of the Australian dollar which threatened to rekindle 
inflation; inter~est rates were again on the increase; ther~e was a marked deterioration in the 
balance of payments deficit of about $9.5 billion. Over time, these areas of concern 
forced a change in wages policy. 
'The A·CTU, supported by the Commonwealth, sought full indexation. The 
Commission acceded to the claim and granted award wage increases of 2.6 percent 
(Australian Conciliation and Arbitration Commission., 1985a). 
At the Nov·ember National Wage case, 3 matters were under consideration: union 
applications for wage increases of 3.8 percent to reflect increases in the CPI; union 
applications for 4 percent increases in wages or improvements in ~conditions of 
employntent on account of national productivity; and a CAl application for a review of 
the Principles of wage detet .anination. 
Though the econo.my had continued to grow and unemployment to fall, the 
accumulating overseas indebtedness was a .major source of concern. The floating of the 
Australian dollar had resulted in its depreciation by 20 pefcent (trade weighted). t'The size 
of the devaluation", the Commission noted, "is tangible ·warning that Australia has been 
borrowing too heavily from abroad as reflected in the size of the balance of payments and 
the international debt". (Australian Conciliation and Arbitration Commission 1985b, 
p.lO). There was also a realization that devaluation could benefit the manufacturing 
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sector, but only if the imported component of the CPI was not reflected in wage 
adjustments. Of the 3.8 percent CPI increase, the Australian Bureau of Statistics 
estimated that 1.2 percent was the result of overseas factors. Employers submitted that 
the CPI should be discounted for the effects of devaluation. 
Because of the Labor Government's strong submission to the effect that Commission 
should take into account the effects of devaluation, the ACTU had a real concern that 
discounting would take place. This would have put it in a difficult position in being able 
to guarantee the "substantial compliance" requirements under the wage guidelines. 
Another critical consideration was that the National Wage case opened at about the same 
time as the ACTU was holding its biennial congress. It had to act to remove the 
potential friction between it and its affiliates as well as between itself and the 
Government. As it happened, changes in the Liberal Party also played a part in 
developments. In the week of the congress, Mr J. Howard, a "dry" committed to labour 
market deregulation, became Leader of the Opposition. This added to the imperative for 
the political and industrial wings of the labour movement to reach some workable 
arrangement. This was enshrined in the Accord Mark II which was endorsed by the 
congress. In summary, this provided for: (a) A full national wage adjustment of 3.8 per 
cent in the current case and a defeunent of any discounting for devaluation to the next 
national wage case which was expected to be held in April 1986. The discounting on that 
occasion would cover the direct effects of the devaluation on the CPI for the four quarters 
of 1985 but would be limited to 2 per cent. To compensate for the discounting, the 
Government agreed to reduce income tax rates from September 1986. (b) The 4 per cent 
productivity claim would be pursued by way of an improvement in occupational 
superannuation. Negotiations on superannuation could proceed on the understanding that 
the cost impact of any new or improved arrangements would not occur before July 1986. 
(c) The existing principles would continue in force until replaced by the Commission. 
This agreement gave the Government a major victory - the frrst time in history that 
the ACTU had agreed to discounting. There were 2 other advantages of the agreement. 
The Government was able to counter opposition claims to the effect that it had been 
impotent in getting union agreement on treating devaluation as a special case, thus 
reducing the longer-tettn potential of devaluation. The ~Government was also able to 
ensure that the 4 percent productivity claimed by the ACTU was not to be paid in the 
fotna of wages. Rather, it had been linked to the Govemm.ent's own agenda of trying to 
reduce the long-tetna problem of an ageing population dependent upon welfare payments. 
The Accord Mark II resulted in the Commission delaying consideration of the 
discounting of the CPI to the frrst National Wage case of 1986. It also enabled the 
Commission to postpone consideration of the productivity claim. Thus, the only major 
consideration was the claim for a 3.8 percent CPI adjustment 
Having lost out on the devaluation route. employers had a difficult case to argue. 
They claimed that the economy could not afford wage increases- a claim made at every 
National Wage case. They further claimed that industrial disputes were a factor which 
ought be taken into account and which should lead to discounting. They were not helped 
in this argument by the fact that the industrial disputation was at its lowest level in 20 
years, nor by the fact that the guidelines provided that specific industries experiencing 
disputation could apply for exemptions to wage increases. The Commission awarded the 
full 3.8 percent 
In February 1986, the Commission began hearing the National Productivity, Review 
of Principles and National Wage case. Judgement was not delivered until June. The case 
involved 3 substantive issues: the review of the Wage Fixing Principles; union 
application for wage adjustments of 2.5 percent based upon CPI movements in the 
September and December 1985 quarters; and union applications for a "4% increase in 
wages and salaries or improvements in conditions by way of superannuation based on 
national productivity and amounting to a 3% wage equivalent" (Australian Conciliation 
and Arbitration Commission., 1986a, p . 2}. 
Australian wages policy 1983-90 79 
The Bench heard arguments from some employer quarters for the abandonment of the 
centralized system in favour of industry by industry or establishment by establishment 
wage deternaination. In dete1anining to maintain a centtalized system the Commission 
claimed to "have taken into account the merits of the submissions in theory and in 
practice". It had come to the conclusion that "in the present circumstances, the 
continuance of a structured centralised system provides the best prospects for maximum 
labour cost restraint together with reasonable industrial stability, both essential 
ingredients for economic recovery". It added: 
We base this conclusion partly on the absence of any convincing material 
·which would indicate how any alternative system would operate, and partly and 
more positively on our understanding of labour market institutions in this 
country. . . . The decentralised, award-by-award system proposed ... ignores 
important practical ~considerations. First, the institutional framework within 
which industrial relations is conducted which includes a multiplicity of awards 
within each industry., many of them extending to a number of industries; the 
operations of Federal and State tribunals in particular industries; the 
occupational structure of unions; and a multiplicity of employer groups. These 
institutional characteristics ·which operate in Australian labour markets are a far 
cry from the simple ent·erprise-oriented industrial relations ,systems on which 
the submissions from decentralised wage fixing appear to be pre~nised. Second, 
the decentralised approach gives little weight 'to the high probability that frrms 
or indus·tries, each acting independently in accordance with its own perceiv·ed 
interest~ in conjunction with trade unions doing likewise, can result in a general 
wage increase greatly in excess of the capacity of the economy. The pressure of 
comparative wage justice is a real force in industrial relations. The str·ength of 
this concept, the place it holds in the thinking of employers and employees, 
even with high unemployment, together with the institutional characteristics 
of the labour market, to which we have referr~ would ensure that across-the-
board wage increases of similar amount would occur~ and not varying increases 
based on capacity of individual industries an establishments. Thus, for 
example, a local or sectional settlement agreed to in a strategic industry, based 
on its ability to absorb or pass on wage increases, would flow generally 
regardless of the economic capacity of individual firms or industries. The 
perceived advantages of .a decentralised system so eloquently argued by its 
proponents on the basis of the experience of select ·countries is illusory and at 
best transient in the context of the current Australian labour market. This is so 
clearly exposed in the experiences of the late 1960s .and more recently during 
1981/82, that it is surprising that the proponents of decentralisation should 
continue to ignore the lessons of history .and th~eir underlying institutional 
bases (Australian Conciliation and Arbitration Commission, 1'986~ p.4). 
The Commission decided to extend to July 1988 the Wage Fixing Principles, subject 
to so.me modifications. The most important of these was the inclusion of a new 
Principle 3 dealing with superannuation. This provided for the certification of ~consent 
agreements regarding employer contributions to approved superannuation funds from a 
date to be approved by the Commission and not before 1 January 1987. Such 
contributions were not to involve the equivalent of a wage increase in excess of 3 percent 
of ordinary time earnings, and could not involve r~ettospective payment of contributions. 
The requirement for a consent award limited the extension of superannuation to those 
cases where employers and unions could reach agfeement. This new Principle, the 
Commission hoped, would take account of the ACTIJs productivity ~claim. 
In considering the wage claim, the Commission again canvassed the state of the 
economy. Since the introduction of the Wage Fixing Principles in September 1985, full-
time employment had grown by 8 per~cent while total ~employment had gfown by 10 
percent. Unemployment had fallen from 10.3 percent to 7.9 percent despite a substantial 
incr~ease in the labour force participation rate. On the basis of a constant participation 
80 David H. Plowman 
rate, the unemployment rate would have fallen to 5.2 percent. The number of WOJking 
days lost through strikes had fallen to 40 percent of the average annual level of the 
preceding 10 years. Further, until the devaluation effect on prices came into play, the 
inflation rate had fallen substantially - from 11.5 percent in 1982-83 to 5.8 percent in 
1984-85. Following virtually no growth iD 1982-83, non-farm GDP grew by 3.5 
percent, 4.6 percent and 4.0 percent in 1983-84, 1984-85 and 1985-86 respectively. The 
Bench concluded: 
Before dealing with the current economic difficulties it is important to 
acknowledge the record of economic achievement since September 1983 ... u 
well as the role played by the Wage Fixin1 Principles. It would be noted that 
the danger and difficulties of a wage explosion, so often encountered after a 
prolonged wage pause, were avoided in the transition to a policy of labour cost 
restraint under a structure centralised system (Australian Conciliation and 
Arbitration Commission, 1986a, p.4 ). 
The Achilles heel of economic management, however, continued to be the external 
sector. Devaluation had reversed the downward spiral in prices. The CPI increase for the 
year ending March quarter 1986 was 9.1 percent. The price of Ausbalian commodities, in 
particular wool, wheat, minerals and metals had fallen, resulting in a further deterioration 
of the te1ms of trade. Thus, while the volume of exports and imports rose by 14.1 and 
0.9 percent respectively over the 12 months to the March quarter 1986, their 
corresponding values rose by 18.9 and 21.5 percent. The Commission concluded: 
In summary, since we embarked on the centralised systeut in September 1983, 
the economy had made rapid gains in terms of growth in GDP and employment; 
the unemployment rate although still unacceptably high has fallen; wage 
increases have come down markedly; real unit labour costs are down at or close 
to the levels of the late 1960s; and profit shares are back at or close to the rates 
of the late 1960s. All this has happened in a much more stable industrial 
relations climate in which Wage Fixing Principles have generally been adhered 
to in an orderly way with little earning drift due to over award payments and 
some 96 percent of total earnings being attributed to national wage. 
However, the recovery has encountered a persistent and serious balance of 
payments problem which, in floating exchange rate regime, has led to a 
substantial devaluation of the Australian dollar. This proble,m is in part due to 
the very rapid growth of the Australian econoJny itself in the context of much 
slower growth in the world economy; but it hu been more seriously affected by 
a very adverse movement in Australians terms of trade. While it is not unusual 
for the terms of trade to worsen following a devaluation, the extent of 
devaluation is largely due to the considerable fall in world commodity prices 
which affects the bulk of our exports. The signs are that these prices will 
remain low in the next 2 years. Unless the deficit in the balance of payments is 
reduced, the growth in our exleinal debt is halted and the Australian dollar is 
stabilised, the economy faces the prospect of losing all the gains made in the 
last 3 years (Australian Conciliation and Arbitration Commission, 1986a, p.4). 
The unions' claim was based on the 4.3 percent increase in the CPI for the 
September and December 1985 quarters. In accordance with the Accord Mark II, the 
ACTU agreed to discounting of up to 2 percent. The Commission discounted by this 
amount and awarded wage increases of 2.3 percent. It furthez dete11nined that the next 
National Wage adjustment would not operate before January 1987. Thus the 2.3 percent 
increase would be the only National Wage increase in 1986. 
The Commission remained confident that the centralized Wage Fixing Principles 
which it had adopted in September 1983, and whose operation it had decided m extend to 
July 1988, would provide the appropriate wage environment for redressing the economic 
problems. Indeed, in its June 1986 judgement, the Commission opined that "fiscal and 
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monetary measures have been applied to slow down the growth of domestic demand; and 
although it is too soon to be confident, there are signs that the balance of payments is 
beginning to turn around" (Australian Conciliation and Arbitration Commission, 1986a, 
p.l3). This optimism proved unfounded. 
In November 1986, the Commission again met to consider National Wage 
adjustments. It considered union applications seeking 6.7 percent increases "to 
compensate for the movement in the CPI for the 9 months ended September 1986" 
(Australian Conciliation and Arbitration Commission, 1986b, p . 4). There were a 
number of ·employer applications "to provide a vehicle for a test case on the removal of 
the annual leave loading from Federal awards". The CAl sought a review of the 
Principles of Wage Fixing adopted in June 1986 and further sought "to hav·e 
superannuation fully considered in the context of the Review" (Australian Conciliation 
and Arbitration Commission, l986b). Again, attention focused on the balance of 
payments problem. The Commonwealth submitted: 
Corrections of the imbalances that have developed in Australia's external 
accounts is necessary. If this is not done, the economy runs the risk of 
becoming enmeshed in a vicious circle of exchange rate depreciation, mounting 
inflation and deepening external imbalances. 
This ·would result in an erosion in overseas and domestic confidence in the 
economy's future, seriously undermining private investment, economic activity 
and employment The current account deficit would eventually be reduced but at 
a cost of a deep recession in the economy (Australian Conciliation and 
Arbitration Commission, l986b). 
The Acru realized that the ~economic situation, in particular the serious deterioration 
in the balance of payments, would possibly produce only partial indexation. This could 
seriously weaken, if not destroy, support for the current system of wage fixation. With 
that in mind., the ACTU submitted "that in advance of the current system self-destructing, 
we have sought as a fall-back or secondary position a modified approach" (Australian 
~Conciliation and Arbitration Commission, 1 986b, p.5). 
The ACTU's modified approach envisaged a 2-tiered system. The frrst tier would be 
generalized wage increases for all wage earners by way of a National Wage detennination . 
'The second tier would provide for wage adjusunents, to a predetetnained ceiling, for 
improv·ed efficiency. This 2-tiered approach found support from the Commonwealth and 
the CAI. The case was adjourned to a conference to be convened by the President in 
January 1987. The principle purpose of the conference was the detetnaination of new 
wage guidelines. 
2. The 2-tiered system 
In March 1987 the Commission announced the 2-tiered wage guidelines. The frrst 
tier provided for a National Wage increase of $10 per week and provision for the 
Commission to consider a further 1.5 percent increase in October 1987. The second tier 
provided for a further 4 percent increase on account of improved efficiency. To this end, 
the Commission introduced the Restructuring and Efficiency Principle. This stated: 
(a) Increases in rates of pay or improvements in conditions of employment 
may be justified as a result of measures implemented to improve efficiency in 
both the public and private sectors. 
(i) Changes to work practices and changes to management practices must be 
accepted as an integral part of an exercise conducted in acco:rdance with 
this principle. 
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(ii) Other initiatives may include action to reduce demarcation barriers, 
advance multi-skilling 1 training and re-training, and broad-banding.2 
(iii) Changes in work practices may be necessary. 
(b) This principle shall be subject to the second tier ceiling [of 4 percent] 
(Australian Conciliation and Arbitration Commission, 1987, p.36). 
The Commission identified some of the positive changes it expected to flow from 
the new principle: 
There will be an examination of restrictive work and management practices 
in both the private and public sectors to identify areas of inefficiency and 
to develop means to overcome them; 
if improved efficiency and productivity require the introduction or 
extension of multi-skilling and broad-banding, these will be traded by the 
parties as an appropriate element in the restructuring exercise. 
similarly, there should be acceptance of the concept that the reduction of 
demarcation barriers may be essential to the success of an exercise; and 
where new classifications are needed to give effect to the change which 
have been introduced, the parties will seek an appropriate award variation 
(Australian Conciliation and Arbitration Commission, 1987, p.13 ). 
This decision marked a major change in traditional National Wage detertnination. 
Historically such wage detennination adjudicated upon income distribution. This 
National Wage decision called for cost offsets. Thus it was as concerned with income 
generation as income distribution. Further, the decision attempted to decentralize the 
second tier. Though it considered that national! y agreed guidelines could assist in the 
proper processing of enterprise-based restructuring and efficiency exercises, it stressed that 
"it [was] primarily at the enterprise level that the objective of this principle [would] be 
achieved". 
Surveys by the Department of Industrial Relations indicate that over 80 percent of 
employees covered by awards had received second tier wage increases by January 1989. 
This figure increased to nearly 100 percent by the end of that year (Deparment of 
Industrial Relations, 1990). 
The Department surveys identified 5 major areas in which changes had occurred. The 
most common of these was changes in the method of payments, in particular the move to 
the electronic transfer of wages. In a number of other cases, provision was made for 
payment by cheque. 
The second area identified was the more flexible use of labour. A considerable 
number of second-tier agreements provided scope for multi-skilling, broad-banding and the 
development of career paths. In some cases there was provision for the greater use of part 
time and casual labour. There was also provision for the handling of demarcation 
disputes and the removal of demarcation barriers. 
The third area identified was the provision of grievance procedures for avoiding or 
settling industrial disputes. 
The fourth area concerned the greater spread of working hours and the reduction in 
non-productive time (e.g. wash-up time, tea breaks etc). Other agreements provided for 
improved shift arrangements, greater flexibility in rostered days off and during public 
holidays and shut-down periods. 
The fifth area concerned management practices and quality control. Many second-tier 
agreements made provision for the introduction of Total Quality Control programs. 
1 The term "multi-skilling" refers to the provision of further training to current employees 
to enable them to carry out tasks not covered by their present job classification. 
2 The term "broad-banding" means the bringing together under a single classification or 
title a number of jobs that were separately or individually classified. It is a reduction in 
the total number of differently classified jobs within an award or enterprise. 
Australian wages policy 1983-90 83 
Others provided for improved communication, consultation and inforntation sharing 
arrangements. 
Despite these positive outcomes, there were reservations regarding the continuance of 
the 2-tiered system. There was concern regarding the limitations on "trade-off' exercises, 
in particular in the most efficient enterprises. 
These concerns were reviewed at the June-July National Wage case of 1988. The 
ACTU submitted that the Restructuring and Efficiency Principle had helped eliminate 
inefficient practices and to increased flexibility. It supported the continued operation of a 
principle aimed at restructuring, but felt that such a principle needed a broader and longer-
tetin scope so as to facilitate award resttucturing, skill acquisition and changes to work 
organization. The Commission concluded that the March 1987 Principles had been 
"reasonably successful": 
The proper application of the restructuring and ·efficiency principle called for a 
position approach by trade unions, their members and individual workers and 
by employer organizations., their members and individual employers. In the 
~Commission's experience some wer·e inadequate for the task. Many others made 
positive efforts: the best not only deriv·ed benefits which produced immediate 
efficiency and ·productivity improv.ements but also laid the foundations for 
future improvement (Australian Industrial Relations ·Commission, 1988, p.5). 
The Commission maintained a 2-tiered approach to wages but replaced the 
Restructuring and Efficiency Principle with the Structural and Efficiency Principle. This 
Principle was designed to: 
provide incentive and scope within the wage fixation system for parties to 
examine their awards with a view to: 
-
establishing skill-related career paths which provide an incentive for 
workers to continue to participate in skill formation; 
eliminating impediments to multi-.skilling and broadening the range of 
tasks which a worker may be required ·to perform; 
creating appropriate relativities between different categories of workers 
within the award and at entet prise level; 
ensuring that working patterns are arrangements enhance flexibility and 
m·eet the competitive requirements of the industry ... (Australian 
~Conciliation and .Arbitration Commission, 1988, p.6). 
The Commission noted that the new principle was designed to facilitate fundamental 
reviews of awards to ensure that their sttuctures remained relevant to the requirements of 
modern competitive industry. It was not intended to "be applied in a negative cost-
cutting manner or to fottnalise illusory, short-tettn benefits". The new Principle stated: 
Structural Efficiency; 
Increases in wages and salaries or improvement in conditions .. . .shall be 
justified if the union(s) party to an award formally agree(s) to co-operate 
positively in a fundamental review of the awards with a view to implementing 
measures to improve the efficiency of industry and provide workers with access 
to more variecL fulfilling and better paid jobs. The measures to be considered 
should include but not be limited to: 
-
-
establishing skill-related career paths which provide an incentive for 
workers to continue to participate in skill formation; 
eliminating impediments to multi -skilling and broadening the range of 
tasks which a worker may be requiJed to perform; 
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creating appropriate relativities between different categories of workers 
within the award and at enterprise level; 
ensuring that working patterns and arrangements enhance flexibility and 
the efficiency of the industry; 
including propetly fiXed minimum rates for classification in awards, related 
appropriately to one another, with any amounts in excess of these properly 
fiXed minimum rates being expressed as supplementary payments; 
- updating and/or rationalising the list of respondents to awards; 
- addressing any cases where award provisions discriminate against sections 
of the work-force (Australian Conciliation and Arbitration Commission, 
1988). 
In February 1989, the National Wage Bench met to review the Structural and 
Efficiency Principle. It handed down its decision in May. "Most of the parties and 
intervenors", the Bench noted, "infot1ned the Commission of the progress that has been 
made in the areas they represent" The Bench added: 
The material indicated that progress is uneven and varies from industry to 
industry and enterprise to enterprise. It also showed that negotiations are 
proceeding at different levels and that, in some cases, progress is slow because 
of disagreement over the agenda and procedure. Preparedness to consider 
change also appears to vary widely. Progress in some areas is considerable but 
in the majority is minimal. Notwithstanding that, we are satisfied that the 
principle as framed in the August 1988 decision can and should facilitate 
negotiations over a wide range of issues and award areas (Australian Industrial 
Relations Commission, 1989a, p.2). 
The Commission accepted, in principle, the ACTU's submission for a national 
framework or "blueprint" approach to restructuring. That blueprint would provide 
"consistent, coherent award structures" based on training and skills acquired, and which 
"would bear clear and appropriate work value relationships one to another". The ACTU 
sought endorsement of proposed wage relativities spanning the building., metal, 
warehousing, road transport and clerical industries. It has been argued elsewhere that this 
blueprint approach could have the effect of replacing one rigid wages system with another 
equally rigid and inflexible system (Plowman, 1990). 
In June 1989 the National Wage Bench convened yet again: 
to determine whether any wage adjustment should be made having regard to the 
progress of award restructuring, the tax changes that have been announced, the 
state of the economy and the extent to which unions arc prepared to make the 
necessary commitments" (Australian Industrial Relations Commission, 
1989b). 
It decided to adjust wage rates between $10 and $15 per week with a second increment 
to be added 6 months later. The commencement date of the frrst increase was to be the 
date "on which an award is varied following examination by the Commission of the 
proposals for restructuring and the giving of commitments". This decision was intended 
as a spur to restructuring negotiations. Furthermore., "the second instalment of the 
structural efficiency adjustment should only be available if the Commission is satisfied 
that the principle has been properly implemented and will continue to be implemented 
effectively" (Australian Industrial Relations Commission, 1989b ). 
Such negotiations have continued but have not been the subject of empirical analysis 
to date. A National Wage review, scheduled for May 1990, has still to hand down its 
decision. It is to the Accord Mark VI that one may turn to seek an indication of the 
future of wage detetntination. 
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3. The Accord Mark VI 
The Accord, first agreed to in 1983, has been the instrument of joint ACIU-
Government approaches to the Commission. In essence, the union movement has 
bartered with the ~Government over an improved social wage regime and reduced taxation 
in return for wage moderation. The Accord has been singularly successful in averting a 
wages explosion following the lifting of the wage freeze. Similarly, the Accord was the 
vehicl~e whereby wage indexation was abandoned without the political and industrial 
dislocation which accompanied the demise of indexation in 1981. Remarkably, the 
Accord has been the instrument of real wage reduction (in the order of 10 to 11 pefCent) 
without major strikes. Under the Accord, the ACIU has agreed to CPI discounting. The 
Accord has also provided a facilitative ~environment for award restructuring and for 
changing the National Wage focus on income distribution to include income generation. 
The latest version of the Accord was agreed to in February 1990. This states that the 
common objectives of the Labor Government and the ACIU for industrial relations in 
the 1990s are to: improve industrial relations, increase employment, lower inflation and 
interest rates, improve living standards, improve the productivity and the quality of 
employment, increase savings for retirement, and rationalize union and award coverage. 
The essence of the Accord strategy is reaffinned: 
During 1990-91, the parties will, by a combination of wage increases, tax 
reductions and improvements in the social wage, provide for an increase in 
disposable incomes and living conditions while .achieving a sustainable 
reduction in inflation and interest rates (Australian Council of Trade Unions, 
1990). 
There is a recognition by both parties "that the immediate priority in industrial 
relations is to continue with the award restructuring process. To this end, unions have 
given a number of committnents to facilitate restructwing." There is also acceptance that 
the restructuring ex·ercise 
must be accompanied by reasonable wage increases which are consistent with 
aggregate economic outcomes ... to this end the parties agree to work within an 
aggregate wage target of 7 percent for the year 1990/91 (Australian Council of 
Trade Unions, 1990). 
It was proposed that both the A·CfU and Government make submissions to the next 
National Wage review seeking 2 wage increases for 1990: a first increase "to maintain the 
real value of wages in the September quarter 1990 ... and a further increase of $12 per 
week 6 months later". The second instalment was predicated on an inflation rate of 6 
percent, a potentially conservative figure in the light of increased petfoleum prices. The 
Accord provides that in the "event that the annualised rate of inflation is expected to 
exoeed that figure, the parties will review the second adjusunent with the objective of at 
least maintaining real disposable income and to meet the agreed aggregate wage target". 
The Accord further provides for a second superannuation instalment of 3 percent There is 
also provision for over award payments by the variation of the "no extra claims 
commiUnents ... to provide the opportunity for claims based on achieved increases in 
productivity and profitability with resbUCtwing". The Government has PfOmised tax cuts 
of about $7.50 for those on average weekly earnings and improvements in the social 
wage. 
At the time of writing, wages policy is at an impasse. As already noted, the 
proposed May review of wag~es policy has been delayed, in large measure because of the 
illness of the Pfesident. Thus the 2 wage increases agreed to in the A·ccord are in 
abeyance. The Accord's potential underestimating of rate of inflation, its seeming assent 
to a return to full indexation, its watering down of the no further claims provisions and 
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its added superannuation imposts have made it less attractive to employers or the 
Commission. 
In the event of a Wages Principles review the Accord partners may find, for the frrst 
time, that they lack Commission endorsement for their agreement. The ACTU has 
sought to forestall this situation by winning assent from large employers through direct 
action. If successful, the National Wage review would be presented with a fait accompli 
with respect to these employers and could have difficulty not flowing on the results to 
other sectors of the work force. To date, employers have largely resisted union pressures 
and have threatened to make applications themselves for a National Wage review. The 
Accord, and wages policy, are thus facing their greatest challenges. The Accord partners 
are in an interesting Catch-22 situation: a breakdown of the Accord and wages policy will 
have electoral consequences for Labor; the present prognostications are that Labor will 
lose office anyway, a situation which suggests to some union leaders that the costs 
associated with keeping the Accord alive may not return any long-tettn dividends. 
4. Conclusion 
This article has reviewed Australian wage detettnination over the period of the Labor 
Government. The Accord has been the major instrument for reconciling the vested 
interests of the industrial wing of the labour movement with the more generalized 
concerns of the political wing. 
There has been much debate in the economic literature regarding the efficacy of wages 
and incomes policies. They have generally been dismissed as little more than circuit 
breakers which result in a wages explosion and a return to the status quo once the policies 
have been lifted. The Australian experience does not support such contentions. The 
Accord has had remarkable longevity and flexibility. In tenus of its basic philosophy of 
stimulating employment while dampening inflation through wage moderation it has been 
remarkably successful. 
The economic problems confronting Australia, and thus the pressures on the Accord 
and wages policies, have to do with those aspects of economic management which do not 
form a coherent part of the Accord which, in essence, is predicated upon economic 
sovereignty. The increasing internationalization of the Australian economy makes more 
difficult controls over the prices component of an incomes and prices Accord. In time, 
this must put increasing pressures on the incomes component. 
To date, the Accord has proved a flexible and pragmatic instrument. Whether such 
flexibility and pragmatism will be sufficient to override the political cycle remains to be 
seen. Much will depend upon international trade and co1n1nerce and, in particular, 
commodity prices. An improvement in Australia's tetins of trade will alleviate the major 
concern of economic management. Prolonged international recession will inevitably 
consign Labor to opposition, and the Accord to the history books. 
Whatever the future holds, the Accord has been an important instrument for changing 
wage determination and awards in a socially acceptable and peaceful way. Economic 
pressures may have achieved similar results. They could have been expected to do so at 
greater social cost than under the Accord and by the reinforcing of antagonistic labour-
management relations. 
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